This paper presents a rational expectations model of asset prices with rationally inattentive investors that, unlike previous papers, explains both the substantial amount of equity wealth invested domestically and the puzzling time series behavior of the home bias -an initial plateau before 1985, then a decrease until 1994 followed by stabilization on another plateau. When there is a …nancial liberalization as in developed countries during the 80's, investors exploit past information to predict current asset payo¤s. The resulting endogenous local information advantage generates a gradual decrease of the home bias until its steady state. In the long run, the home bias remains large due to the interaction of the optimal attention allocation with the optimal portfolio choice. 
Introduction
The home bias puzzle has been the subject of a good deal of research in the literature on international …nance. While some authors have focused on institutional factors, such as capital controls, transaction costs or legal issues, many of the recent studies are stressing the role of asymmetric information. Although all models may explain (some more plausibly than others) the existence of some degree of home bias in international investment behavior, none of them are able to account for the puzzling evolution of the bias through the past two decades. The home bias decreased over a few years from 1985 through 1994, and then remained relatively stable since 1994, as shown by Karolyi and Stulz (2002) and Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) . The objective of this paper is to propose an information based model that, unlike the rest of the literature, can explain both the substantial amount of equity wealth invested domestically and the troubling time series behavior of the home bias.
The home bias puzzle was raised by French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) . They showed that, at the beginning of the 90's, the fraction of stock market wealth invested domestically was around 90% for the U.S. and Japan and around 80% for the U.K.
Several explanations for this puzzle have been provided by the literature on international …nance. In the presence of institutional factors such as capital controls, transaction costs or legal issues one expects investors to hold most of the assets domestically. 1 However, these theories predict a large decrease in the home bias over the last two decades with the fall of international investment barriers that has not occurred. This predicted drop is due to the speed and depth with which institutional barriers to …nancial trade have been removed during the 80's, increasing both de jure and de facto …nancial openness across countries. Recent research analyzes the home bias puzzle using asymmetric information. 2 These models tend to exogenously assume asymmetric information between investors. One of the problems with the models with asymmetric information is that in order to explain the substantial amount of home bias, they need to assume large and implausible information asymmetries. 3 Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007) solved this problem by letting investors choose what home or foreign information to learn about, before deciding what assets to hold. They assume that domestic investors have an information advantage that makes domestic assets slightly less risky, which leads them to purchase more domestic assets than the world portfolio and process only information about local assets. However, in their model, home bias is increasing with the investors'capacity to process information. Hence, if we assume that the information processing capacity has increased as a consequence of the technological progress experienced in the past decade, their model predicts that home bias should have increased over time.
However, neither a signi…cant drop nor an increase has been observed in the home bias over the last decade. Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2006) found that "the average home bias of US investors towards the 47 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries are equally weighted".
The main trouble for all the explanations about home bias, as argued by Karolyi and Stulz (2002) , is explaining the apparent plateau in the time path of the US home bias after 1994. Unlike all the literature, we propose a theory based on asymmetric information that is able to explain the substantial amount of home bias and account for the puzzling evolution of the home bias over time. We present a noisy rational expectations model with rationally inattentive agents. The basic framework, which builds on Peng and Xiong (2005) , Mondria (2007) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007) , consists of two independent risky assets and a continuum of investors who face information processing constraints as in Sims (2003 Sims ( , 2006 . Investors collect information about the state of the economy in order to reduce the uncertainty of their portfolio. However, they face a limited capacity to process information, which they need to allocate between the two risky assets. If investors have a small local information advantage, they optimally decide to hold a portfolio with mostly domestic assets due to the interaction between the optimal attention allocation and the optimal portfolio choice. The better information about local assets, the higher is the domestic asset holdings.
Furthermore, the higher the demand of domestic assets, the greater is the incentive to process information about local assets. The introduction of dynamics in asset payo¤s and …nancial openness to the basic framework allows us to explain the time series behavior of the home bias -an initial plateau before 1985, then a decrease until 1994 followed by stabilization on another plateau. In the model, when a country is in …nancial autarky, investors only process information about domestic assets. After …nancial markets are liberalized as in developed countries during the 80's, investors are able to hold foreign assets and bene…t from international diversi…cation. However, since the information processed while being in autarky can be used to process information about domestic assets in the current period, investors have an endogenous big advantage in holding and processing information about domestic assets. There is a trade o¤ between large endogenous information advantage in domestic assets and diversi…cation.
Investors optimally decide to hold most of their portfolio in domestic assets. They also hold and process information about foreign assets because of diversi…cation purposes, but in a modest way. Over time, the large amounts of information processed in autarky about domestic assets are less helpful to predict current asset payo¤s. Investors gradually tilt their portfolio towards foreign assets and there is decrease in the home bias. However, the decline in the home bias is not too large because of the interaction between the optimal attention allocation and the optimal portfolio choice. In the steady state, since investors have small asymmetric prior beliefs, investors optimally decide to hold a portfolio with mostly domestic assets.
We test some predictions of our model on a panel data set on home bias for 19 developed countries from 1988 until 2004, using three groups of variables that try to measure the degree of information capacity, the degree of informational advantage and the degree of …nancial openness in each of these countries. We consider di¤erent measures of a country's information capacity: the average circulation (or copies printed) of newspapers published at least four times a week; the number of telephone mainlines; the number of mobile telephone subscribers to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology; and the number of people with access to the internet. We proxy for how familiarized the domestic agent is with foreign countries using the number of international departures made from their country of usual residence to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity in the country visited. Financial openness is included using both de facto and de jure measures.
Our baseline speci…cations are able to explain at least 46.8% of the variation of the home bias in our data set. Our estimates con…rm that home bias decreases with …nancial openness, and increases with information capacity and with information advantage, as predicted by our model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, there is a description of the setup and the solution in the static model. Section 3 introduces persistent asset payo¤s and shows an increase in the home bias explained by the model. Section 4 provides an explanation of the home bias behavior over the last twenty years. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides technical derivations and proofs.
The Static Model
Although the main target of the paper is to discuss the puzzling time path of the home bias, we will …rst examine the static version of the model as an intermediary step.
Basic Setup
This model introduces heterogeneity among investors to Mondria (2007) in order to study the interaction of the optimal risk factor choice with the optimal asset holdings of each type of investor. The economy consists of two countries and it is populated by a continuum of investors of measure one. There are two types of investors in the economy: a fraction of home investors and a fraction 1 of foreign investors. Investors hold three di¤erent types of assets: a riskless asset that pays R units of consumption good, a home risky asset and a foreign risky asset.
Home and foreign investors have di¤erent prior beliefs about the asset payo¤s vectorR as in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007) . Investors have an initial advantage in processing information about domestic assets. The initial advantage is modeled as a lower variance in the prior beliefs. The two risky assets are independent and normally distributed. The prior beliefs of an investor i about an asset j are given byr i;j N r j ; 2 r;j , i.e., the prior beliefs of home investors arer h;h N r h ; 2 r;h andr h;f N r f ; 2 r;f where 1 and the prior beliefs of foreign investors arer f;h N r h ; 2 r;h andr f;f N r f ; 2 r;f where 1. Let R and R;h denote the mean vector and the diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the prior beliefs about the asset payo¤s of a home investorR h = (r h;h ;r h;f ) 0 . Let R and R;f denote the mean vector and the diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the prior beliefs about the asset payo¤s of a foreign investorR f = (r f;h ;r f;f ) 0 . The numeraire in the market is the price of the bond andP = (p 1 ;p 2 ) 0 is the price vector of the risky assets. The net supply of the risky asset j is given by the realization of a random variablez j N z j ; 2 z;j . Let Z and Z denote the mean vector and the diagonal covariance matrix of the vector of net supplỹ Z = (z 1 ;z 2 ) 0 . This randomness can be viewed as the result of some trade of a nonspeculative nature (liquidity traders) or some trade from agents lacking perfect knowledge of the market structure (irrational traders). Asset supply randomness is necessary in order to avoid perfect revelation of private information through the price.
This is a static model in which investors live for four periods. In the …rst period, they receive an initial wealth, W i0 , and a limited information processing capacity, . In the second period, investors decide their optimal attention allocation between the two countries. In the third period, after receiving a private signal, which depends on the attention allocation, and freely observing prices, investors choose their optimal asset demand. In the last period, investors consume their portfolio.
Information Processing
The attention allocation decision consists of two di¤erent choices. First, investors decide the form of the private signal, i.e., investors choose if they want to observe a private signal of each asset payo¤ or linear combinations of them. Second, given the form of the private signal, investors decide how much information they want to process about each risky asset.
Investors would like to choose a private signal that reduces all their uncertainty about the asset payo¤s. However, investors face a technological constraint which is called information processing constraint that restricts the amount of information they can process.
Investors are constrained to choose a signal of the following form
where C i is any k 2 matrix," i is independent ofR," i is independent of" k for i 6 = k and i is the variance covariance matrix of" i . The private signal provides information about linear combinations of asset payo¤s. The precision of a signal is higher if more attention is allocated to that particular signal. The private signals are incorporated to the investor's beliefs through rational Bayesian updating. Investors optimally …nd the form of the posterior variance-covariance of the asset payo¤s, which is not initially constrained to be diagonal, by choosing the matrix of weights, C i ; and the variance-covariance matrix of the error term, i , in the private signal subject to the information processing constraint.
Following Peng and Xiong (2005) and Sims (2003 Sims ( , 2006 , we use concepts of information theory to quantify the amount of information that a private signal contains about the asset payo¤s. The information processing constraint is given by
The information constraint restricts the amount of information contained in the private signal.
Prices are freely observable and investors do not waste any capacity by processing them. There is a second constraint that also limits the way an investor can choose a private signal. The no-forgetting constraint restricts investors from forgetting information already known in order to process other types of information and it is given by
This constraint rules out the possibility that investors increase their uncertainty about an asset in order to reduce more uncertainty about another asset.
Investors, with absolute risk tolerance parameter , maximize their mean-variance objective function
subject to the budget constraint
where W i0 is the initial wealth of agent i, X i = (x i;1 ; x i;2 ) 0 is the asset holdings vector of agent i,R is the vector of risky asset payo¤s andP is the price vector of the risky assets. The market clearing conditions are given by 
Solution
The model is solved using backward induction. First, given an arbitrary attention allocation, each agent decides the optimal asset holdings. Second, given the optimal risky asset demand for each attention allocation, each agent decides the optimal attention allocation.
Optimal Asset Holdings
In the third period, after observing the private signals and the asset prices, investors derive their posterior beliefs about the asset payo¤s in order to choose their optimal asset holdings
The rational expectations equilibrium price is found by aggregating these asset demands and imposing the market clearing conditions as in Admati (1985) .
Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium price that depends on both market aggregates
Expressions for A 0 ; A 1 and A 2 are in the appendix. The optimal asset holdings by an investor i are given by
Expressions for G 0 ; G 1 and G 2 are in the appendix.
Optimal Attention Allocation
In the second period, investors decide the form of the private signal and the amount of information they want to process about each market.
The objective function in the second period is found by introducing the optimal asset holdings in the objective function and taking the expected value. Investors maximize
which can be rewritten as
Proposition 2 Each investor allocates all the limited capacity, , to learn about one linear combination of asset payo¤ s. C i is a 1 2 matrix.
Investors choose to process information about their portfolio. As long as they are interested in holding both types of assets, investors have incentives in observing a linear combination of the asset payo¤s, which is always an available option as pointed out by Sims (2003 Sims ( , 2006 . 
and investors choose i to be
which exist as long as a parameter constraint is satis…ed
Expressions for Q hf and Q are also in the appendix. 
Numerical Example: investment specialization
Investors optimally decide to specialize in processing information about the asset in which they have an initial advantage because of the interaction of the optimal asset holding and the optimal attention allocation. Intuitively, the more information about one asset, the higher are the holdings of that asset. Furthermore, the higher the asset demand, the higher the incentives to process information about the asset.
We run a numerical example in order to show the optimal investment specialization. 5 Home and foreign assets have expected payo¤s 2 and standard deviation of prior beliefs 20%.
Domestic investors have a 10% initial advantage in domestic assets, = 1:1. Following
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004), home bias is de…ned as
Home Bias = 1 Share of f oreign equities in U:S: P ortf olio Share of f oreign equities in W orld P ortf olio
As we can see in Figure 1 , as long as the information processing capacity, , is higher than zero, investors tilt their portfolio towards the domestic asset and the initial information advantage is magni…ed. The optimal level of specialization generates a substantial amount of home bias.
It is only a bit smaller than the home bias generated by only fully specializing in domestic assets as in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007). As we explained before, the home bias with optimal specialization is lower than with full specialization because of diversi…cation reasons. Investors want to hold foreign assets to diversify their portfolio. As a consequence, foreign assets are generating volatility in the portfolio and that is why it is optimal to pay some attention to foreign assets. In the full specialization environment, investors are holding foreign assets, but they are not processing any information about them.
In this model investors choose a private signal from a richer set than Peng and Xiong when assets are independent, investors are constrained to choose either a signal about the domestic asset or about the foreign asset. In this model, even though investors are able to choose any linear combination among both assets, investors optimally decide to process mostly information about home assets, which substantially tilts their portfolio away from the world portfolio towards domestic assets.
In the same Figure 1 , we can also see that the amount of home bias generated by the initial information advantage is small. If there is no information advantage, as in Proposition 3, then all investors hold the same portfolio and there is no home bias.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
A testable implication of the model is that the more information processing capacity investors have, the more their portfolios are tilted away from the world portfolio towards the domestic assets. Intuitively, the amount of home equity bias depends on what the domestic investor knows relative to the average investor. As the information processing resources increase, the higher is the knowledge wedge between the domestic and the average investor and therefore, the larger is the home bias. In Figure 2 , we can see how the attention allocated to domestic assets is increasing with the information processing capacity. The attention allocated to domestic assets by the home investor is the weight that the home asset has relative to the foreign asset in the private signal and is given by 
Introducing Dynamics
In this section, we examine the dynamics of our model when the asset payo¤s follow an autoregressive process. As we have seen in the previous section, investors specialize in processing information about assets in which they have an initial advantage. When the asset payo¤s have some persistence, information processed about asset payo¤s in the current period is also useful to process information about the asset payo¤s in the following period. Thus, the initial advantage is magni…ed period after period since investors optimally choose to process more information about domestic assets in every period.
Persistent Asset Payo¤s
Let us assume that asset payo¤s behave as an AR(1) , while the conditional variance of the asset payo¤s given information at t,
; is given by
At each period new assets are issued and pay o¤ at the end of the period. There are no multi period lived assets. For tractability reasons, we assume that at each period t a continuum of two-period lived investors are born and given an initial wealth. Before dying, each investor i
gives her information to the next investor i born in the following period. 6 Investors face an information constraint that restricts the amount of information to be processed period after period. Investors choose a private signal that reduces their uncertainty by
The information constraint imposes a limit reduction to the posterior variance-covariance matrix of the asset payo¤s. Investors observe a linear combination of asset payo¤s with a measurement errorỸ i;t+1 = C i;t+1Rt+1 +" i;t+1 where" i;t+1 N (0; i ): The conditional variance of R t+1 after receiving a private signal is given by
The information processing constraint can be rewritten by introducing equation (3) and (5) into equation (4) I + U i;t;t+1 C
Numerical Example: home bias magni…ed
This section illustrates the implications of the model when payo¤s are persistent. 7 In Figure   3 , we can observe how home bias is magni…ed when asset payo¤s are persistent, f = 0:9. 8 In the static model, investors are paying more attention to domestic assets because they have an initial information advantage. Hence, the reduction in the posterior variance of the domestic asset payo¤s is higher than the reduction in the posterior variance of the foreign asset payo¤s. When the asset payo¤s are persistent, the information processed in the current period can be used to process information about the asset payo¤s of the following period. Thus, in the following period, the initial advantage is larger than before since investors processed more information about domestic assets during the previous period. Therefore, the initial information advantage is magni…ed period after period providing incentives to domestic agents to hold more and more domestic assets.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Investors tend to allocate more attention to domestic assets through time and the home bias is increasing over time. It is also worthwhile to note that, as in the static model, the higher the information processing capacity, ; the higher the level of home bias. In Figure 4 , we can also see how the attention allocated to domestic assets is also increasing over time. The reason is that investors are tilting their portfolio more towards home and more information is required to be processed about domestic assets.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The introduction of persistent asset payo¤s increases the home bias in ten percentage points relative to the static model and generates a home bias of almost 70% when = 0:8, which is similar to the 76% of home bias in US. 9 However, in terms of dynamics, it generates an increase in the home bias over time. 98.5% of their portfolios in domestic equities. As a result, the home bias averaged a high 96.8% during that period. Between 1985 and 1994, the share of domestic assets in the US 9 A higher information processing capacity, , would generate an even larger amount of home bias. 1 0 We would like to thank Frank Warnock for kindly providing us with the data for this graph.
Explaining the Behavior of Home Bias 4.1 The Puzzling Evolution of Home Bias
portfolio decreased almost 10%, and after 1994 it stabilized in its current level, around 89.5%.
The home bias sharply decreased from its previous level until reaching 83.6% in 1994, and although it has marginally decreased after that year, averaging 78% in 2000, this observed slight decrease was not signi…cant. Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2006) found that "the average home bias of US investors towards the 47 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries are equally weighted".
[Insert Figure 5 about here] However, the preliminary results obtained in the previous sections predict that home bias should have signi…cantly increased in the past years. We showed that the degree of home bias increases over time since past information is used to process information about the current state of the economy when asset payo¤s are persistent. It turns out that only when we combine …nancial openness with persistent payo¤s we are able to explain the time series behavior of the home bias -an initial plateau before 1985, then a decrease until 1994, followed by stabilization on another plateau. In the 70's, developed economies were almost in …nancial autarky. There was very little …nancial openness, both de jure and de facto. There were many barriers to international trade in assets and as a consequence the observed volume of …nancial trade was very small. During the 80's institutional restrictions to international …nancial investment were removed in most of the developed economies. In the following numerical example, we use our model to simulate the portfolio choices of a country that is forced to live in …nancial autarky for a couple of periods before opening up to …nancial transactions. As we will see, the simulated path mimics the observed path described by actual data.
Numerical Example: adding …nancial openness
When there are many restrictions to international trade in assets, the countries are practically behaving as …nancial autarkies (a situation that resembles the 70's). If investors are only allowed to hold domestic assets, they only process information about domestic assets. When markets are open to the rest of the world, investors have incentives to hold foreign assets in order to obtain gains from diversi…cation. This leads them to start processing information about foreign markets. However, investors have a really big information advantage in processing information about domestic assets because they have been processing information about their home for a long time. Since this information is useful to process information about future asset payo¤s, investors will smooth their transition towards holding foreign assets and the home bias decreases through time.
In Figure 6 , the asset payo¤s are persistent and investors are banned from investing in foreign assets for 5 periods (years). Therefore, investors have been only holding and processing information about domestic assets. After 5 periods, foreign markets are opened. Thus, investors have incentives to hold foreign assets because of diversi…cation reasons. At …rst, there is a big jump in the home bias because foreign markets are open at once and in an unanticipated way. There are no problems of sovereign risk, there is no transition in the openness and the information is all immediately available to foreign investors. However, investors mostly hold domestic assets because they have learned so much about home that they want to bene…t from their information advantage. The information advantage when the markets are opened decreases over time and makes it more desirable for investors to hold foreign assets and to bene…t from the gains of diversi…cation. The decline in the home bias is not too large because of the interaction between the optimal attention allocation and the optimal portfolio choice. The better information about domestic assets, the higher the domestic asset holdings.
Furthermore, the higher the demand of domestic assets, the greater the incentive to process information about domestic assets. Therefore, in steady state, when investors have small asymmetric prior beliefs, investors optimally decide to hold a portfolio with mostly domestic assets.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
This Figure 6 shows a gradual transition from the pre-liberalization equilibrium to the postliberalization equilibrium. In Figure 7 , we observe how the attention allocated in domestic assets behaves after the markets are opened to …nancial trade. If the economy is in autarky, the amount of attention allocated at home is in…nite. When the economy opens, the attention allocated to domestic assets decreases over time because investors start holding and paying attention to foreign assets.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
The introduction of …nancial autarky in the model for a number of periods generates a smooth decline in the home bias followed by stabilization in a new plateau, as shown by Karolyi and Stulz (2002) 
Empirical Evidence
Numerical simulations of the model presented in this paper yielded three basic predictions:
(1) home bias increases with (home) information advantage; (2) home bias decreases with …nancial openness; and (3) home bias increases with information capacity. In this section, we will test these predictions.
Data
The dataset includes measures of home bias, information capacity and …nancial openness for 19 industrialized countries during 17 years (1988-2004) . 11 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. formation that is freely available in the outside world. The latter refers to human decision making limitations, or how e¢ ciently the information that was accessed through the "wires"
is used when real actions are taken. In this paper, we focus on "wiring"capacity, since it can be measured with a lesser degree of subjectivity.
The World Bank's World Development Indicators database includes four di¤erent measures of "wiring" capacity: the average circulation (or copies printed) of newspapers published at least four times a week; the number of telephone mainlines; the number of mobile telephone subscribers to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology; and the number of people with access to the internet.
In our baseline speci…cation, we will choose telephone lines as the representative of a country's communication technology. This choice is based on several reasons. First, data for this technology is available for all countries in almost every year of our sample, which is not the case for newspapers. Second, …xed telephone lines represented a mature technology in all these countries during all these periods, as opposed to internet or mobile phones, which became popular only in the late 90's. Third, this choice is along the lines of Portes and Rey (2005) analysis of cross-border equity ‡ows: they show that telephone call tra¢ c is a good proxy for overall information ‡ow between two countries. Fourth, Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2006) show that a country's relative position in the ranking of adoption of a speci…c technology is highly correlated to its relative position in the ranking of adoption of other technologies. They report that "the median correlation of country ranking across technologies within the OECD is 0.54". This means that the country with greater capacity in terms of telephone mainlines is most likely the country with greater capacity in other telecommunication technologies. 13 We take as our main measure of a country's information capacity the number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people normalized by a country's GDP per capita (in thousands of US The same normalizations will be applied to the other three measures of information capacity that will be used in the robustness checks. That is, we will also present results using the total number, the number per 1,000 people, and the number per 1,000 normalized by the per capita GDP of newspapers, internet and mobile as explanatory variables.
Financial Openness
We [Insert Figure 8 and 9 about here]
We consider both types of measures in our analysis since each has its own drawbacks.
The main weakness of de jure measures is that investors may …nd ways to circumvent capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected e¤ect of the regulatory capital controls. The main weakness of de facto measures is that they may re ‡ect changes in macroeconomic conditions even if there are no regulatory changes on capital account transactions. However, we will show that our results are robust to the choice of measure of …nancial openness that we use.
Familiarity
We also look at a variable that proxies for familiarity with foreign countries, the inverse of (home) informational advantage. This variable, int 0 l departure, is the number of departures (per 1,000 people) made from their country of usual residence to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity in the country visited. The higher this number, the more familiarized are domestic residents with foreign cultures, and therefore, the smaller the information di¤erential between home and foreign, which means that the informational advantage about home relative to foreign is also smaller. According to our model, the higher the familiarity e¤ect, the smaller the informational advantage and the smaller should be the home bias.
It is interesting to notice that our measure of familiarity includes only non-business related international departures. The exclusion of business related international travel is particularly important because of endogeneity reasons. It is not unusual to conduct more international business trips the more you invest abroad. In this case, reverse causality would be an issue.
By excluding international trips of business related nature, we are capturing the impact of familiarity e¤ects that are being generated by more general factors on portfolio investment decisions.
Estimation Output

Basic Speci…cation
Our basic speci…cation has home bias as the dependent variable and the normalized number of telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people, per $1,000 of income per capita) and the Lane-MilesiFerretti volume-based measure of International Financial Integration (the de facto measure of …nancial openness) as the main explanatory variables. 14 Table 4 presents the estimation results. The di¤erence between each column is the inclusion (or not) of time e¤ects and country e¤ects.
The …rst equation does not include any controls for time e¤ects or country e¤ects. We can see that with only two variables, one capturing …nancial openness and another capturing information capacity, we are able to explain 47% of the variation of the home bias in our panel. Moreover, both coe¢ cients are signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level and have the expected sign. An increase of 1% in our measure of …nancial openness decreases the level of home bias by approximately 0.24%, and an increase of 1% in our measure of information capacity increases the home bias by about 0.22%.
In the second equation, we include time dummy variables. These dummies control for omitted variables that vary through time but are constant across countries. The values of the original coe¢ cients are only marginally changed, and only a small increase in the R 2 is veri…ed, from 47% to 50%. In the third equation, we include only country dummies (…xed e¤ects), in order to control for omitted variables that vary across countries but are constant through time.
We observe a signi…cant increase in the R 2 , to 69%. Both coe¢ cients remain signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level, but there is a signi…cant increase in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient associated with our measure of information capacity. The fourth equation includes both time and country dummies. Another increase in the R 2 is noted, to 75%. Both coe¢ cients remain with the expected signs, but have their signi…cance reduced to the 5% signi…cance level. The magnitude of the home bias elasticity with respect to the …nancial openness is reduced: an increase of 1% in the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti measure of …nancial openness reduces the level home bias by 0.07%. The magnitude of the home bias elasticity with respect to the information capacity is still larger than the one obtained in the …rst equation: an increase of 1% in the normalized number of telephone mainlines increases the level home bias by 0.28%.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Finally, we con…rm our results in the last two equations by performing two di¤erent types of panel estimation. The …fth equation presents the between e¤ects estimates (regression on group means). The coe¢ cient associated to the …nancial openness remains with similar magnitude and is signi…cant at the 5% signi…cance level. The coe¢ cient associated to the information capacity increases to 0.59, although it has its signi…cance reduced to the 10% level. The last equation presents the results of the random e¤ects estimates. Both coe¢ cients have similar magnitudes, the expected sign and are highly signi…cant (at the 1% signi…cance level). Furthermore, this regression tells us that, without using any time or country dummy variable, we are able to explain 50% of the cross sectional variance (the 'between' R 2 ) and 42% of the time series variance (the 'within'R 2 ).
Robustness Checks
Taking the fourth equation in Table 4 as our benchmark equation -the regression with time and country …xed e¤ects -we perform …ve di¤erent robustness checks. Table 5 people. The next two equations exclude the largest countries in terms of market capitalization from the sample. In 1996, the mid-year in our sample, the US market capitalization represented 41.9% of the world's market capitalization, and Japan, the second largest, represented 15.3%.
This means that both countries together were responsible for more than one half of the world's total market capitalization in that year. 16 The fourth equation excludes the US and the …fth equation excludes both the US and Japan. Table 5 shows that our results are robust to all these changes we have considered. First, coe¢ cients and their standard errors remained fairly similar to the benchmark estimate (correct sign, similar magnitude and signi…cance). Also, the R 2 from each remained high, ranging between 73% and 75%.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Finally, we consider one last robustness check. One could argue that our information capacity variable is only statistically signi…cant because it is working as a proxy for a country's level of development. The high overall correlation of 0.71 between the logs of the number of telephone lines per 1,000 people and the per capita GDP suggests that more developed economies have larger overall channel capacity. So it could be the case that the positive and statically signi…cant coe¢ cient is capturing the fact that, for some reason, more developed economies have higher home bias, while channel capacity does not really matter. In order to control for this case, we include per capita GDP in the regression as an additional control. As we can see for the result, this variable is not signi…cant, while the other variables (specially the information capacity variable) remain with correct sign, similar magnitudes and signi…cance.
Familiarity E¤ects
Equations (1) to (4) in Table 6 have home bias as the dependent variable and include the number of international departures (per 1,000 inhabitants) made from the country of usual residence to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity in the country visited, the number of the normalized number of telephone mainlines (per 1,000
people, per $1,000 of income per capita) and the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti volume-based measure of International Financial Integration (the de facto measure of …nancial openness) as the main explanatory variables. Equation (1) does not include any time or country …xed e¤ects, 1 6 In fact, this is true for every year in our sample.
equation (2) includes time e¤ects, equation (3) includes country …xed e¤ects and equation (4) includes both.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Unfortunately, Table 6 and Table 4 (the basic speci…cation) are not directly comparable.
Missing observations for int 0 l departure reduce the sample by approximately 45%, from 293 to 160 observations. However, we can see that both f inopen and telephone have the correct sign, similar magnitudes compared to the coe¢ cients reported in Table 4 , and are signi…cant at the 1% signi…cant level. Interestingly, the number of international departures is also signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level with an expected negative sign: as predicted by our model, the higher the familiarity with foreign countries, the lower the degree of home bias.
Finally, equation (5) While GDP per capita is not signi…cant, the number of international tourist departures is signi…cant at the 5% level with the expected sign.
Alternative Measures of Information Capacity
Equations (1) to (3) in Table 7 report the estimation results of the baseline regression, but each with a di¤erent alternative measure of information capacity (all of them normalized by GDP). We can notice that only newspaper is signi…cant at the 5% level with a predicted positive sign. Mobile phones and internet subscribers were not signi…cant at the 10% level.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In equations (4) to (6) we estimate the model with all four measures of information capacity (including telephone mainlines) at the same time. The di¤erence between each equation is the normalization adopted, respectively: GDP, per 1,000 people and total number. We can notice that the average number of newspaper in circulation is the best measure of information capacity, being the only variable that is signi…cant at the 5% level, with the expected sign.
Once newspaper circulation is included, the number of telephone mainlines is not signi…cant anymore. All three columns also show that the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient associated to newspaper circulation does not depend on the choice of normalization. These results suggest that newspaper is the best measure of information capacity. This is not surprising, if we realize that daily newspaper headlines are still the major source of di¤usion of public information.
The problem of using newspapers as our baseline measure of information capacity is the number of missing observations, that reduces the sample from 293 to only 74.
Finally, the last equation includes …nancial openness, newspaper circulation and also GDP per capita, as a proxy for a country's level of development. We can see that newspaper circulation is still signi…cant at the 5% level with the correct positive sign while GDP per capita is not. This means that the signi…cance of the information capacity variable is not being caused by its correlation with a country's development level.
Conclusion
This paper presents a rational expectations model of asset prices with rationally inattentive investors that can explain both the substantial amount of home bias and the time series behavior of the home bias -an initial plateau before 1985, then a decrease until 1994 followed by stabilization on another plateau. After …nancial markets are liberalized, investors are able to hold foreign assets and gain from international diversi…cation. However, since the information processed while being in autarky can be used to process information about domestic assets in the current period, investors have an endogenous big advantage in holding and processing information about domestic assets. There is a trade o¤ between large endogenous information advantage in domestic assets and diversi…cation. Investors optimally decide to hold most of their portfolio in domestic assets. They also hold and process information about foreign assets because of diversi…cation purposes, but in a modest way. Over time, the large amounts of information processed in autarky about domestic assets are less helpful to predict current asset payo¤s. Investors gradually tilt their portfolio towards foreign assets and there is decrease in the home bias. However, the decline in the home bias is not too large because of the interaction between the optimal attention allocation and the optimal portfolio choice. The better information about domestic assets, the higher is the domestic asset holdings. Furthermore, the higher the demand for domestic assets, the greater is the incentive to process information about domestic assets. Therefore, in steady state, when investors have small asymmetric prior beliefs, investors optimally decide to hold a portfolio with mostly domestic assets.
We test some predictions of our model on a panel data set on home bias for 19 developed countries from 1988 until 2004, using three groups of variables that try to measure the degree of information capacity, the degree of informational advantage and the degree of …nancial openness in each of these countries. We consider di¤erent measures of a country's information capacity: the average circulation (or copies printed) of newspapers published at least four times a week; the number of telephone mainlines; the number of mobile telephone subscribers to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology; and the number of people with access to the internet. We proxy for how familiarized the domestic agent is with foreign countries using the number of international departures made from their country of usual residence to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity in the country visited. Financial openness is included using both de facto and de jure measures. Our baseline speci…cations are able to explain at least 46.8% of the variation of the home bias in our data set. Our estimates con…rm that home bias decreases with …nancial openness, and increases with information capacity and with informational advantage, as predicted by our model.
A Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The objective function in the third period is a standard mean variance objective function. A closed form solution of a REE can be derived following Admati (1985) . The equilibrium prices have the following form
Following Admati, we de…ned as the average precision matrix of the signals weighted by the risk tolerance coe¢ cient.
Intuitively, contains the average stock market information processed by the investors. The conditional distribution ofR given a private signalỸ i and the equilibrium price vectorP is a multivariate normal with variance-covariance matrix
The optimal asset holdings by an investor i, who observes the state of the world with a measurement errorỸ i and the equilibrium price vectorP , are given by
where
Proof of Proposition 2. First, I will derive the objective function in the second period, which is given by
The objective function becomes
Note that
where ER = (er h ; er f ) 0 and
Let x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) 0 N ( ; V ). De…ne the quadratic form q = x 0 Ax, then the expected value of q is E(q) = tr[AV ] + 0 A . Therefore, the objective function is given by
Second, I will show that a normalization of the matrix of weights in the private signal, C i , is required. For any economy in which agents receive signals of the formỸ i = C iR +" i , there exists an economy identical to the original in which investors receive private signalsỸ i = Ỹ i = C iR + " i that has an equilibrium which is indistinguishable from the equilibrium in the original economy and that satis…es the information capacity constraint as well. First, check that the equilibrium is indistinguishable between both economies. There is enough to prove that = =
More details are provided in Admati (1985) . Second, let's check that the new private signal satis…es the information capacity constraint. A nice property of Mutual Information is that it is invariant to any linear combination of the random variables, which implies
Therefore, we need to introduce a constraint on C i in order to avoid the existence of indistinguishable equilibria. We can normalize one element of each row vector of C i . I normalize the matrix of weights C i in the following way
Third, I will show that a normalization of the variance-covariance matrix of the error term in the private signal, i , is required.The variance covariance matrix can be decomposed as follow
where is a diagonal matrix and P 0 = P 1 . For every non-diagonal i , there exists an indistinguishable equilibrium where investors receive a private signalỸ i given bỹ
where var (" i ) = is a diagonal matrix. Therefore, without loss of generality for a given optimal matrix C i , we can let investors choose a diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the error term in the private signal 
The investor when optimizing takes as given er h ; er f ; ; ; ; hh ; hf and f f . Due to the linearity of the objective function in the precision of each private signal and the form of the information constraint, the maximum is a corner solution. Therefore, investors want to allocate all their attention in only one linear combination of asset payo¤s.
Proof of Proposition 3. The objective function in the second period is given by
which can be also written as
The precision of the error of the private signal can be obtained rearranging the information capacity constraint
Rearranging the terms in the objective function and introducing the precision of the private signal, investors maximize
where Q hhi ; Q hf i and Q f f i are given by (7) and er h and er f are given in (8 
This is the reaction function where investors take as given the aggregate variables of the economy. 
B Autocorrelation of Asset Payo¤s
We collected data between Jan 1st, 1980 and Dec 31, 2004 on three major stock price indexes in U.S.: the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, the NYSE Composite Index, and the S&P 500. The original data is at the daily frequency, and for each of the stock price index we calculate two annual series. The end-of-period series contains the closing stock index price at the last trading day of the year; the average series contain the yearly average of the daily closing stock index prices. Table 8 presents the …rst-order autocorrelations of the end-of-period and average annual indexes. We can see that the autocorrelations range from 0.88 to 0.91. and investors are banned from investing in foreign assets for 5 periods, the attention allocated to domestic assets gradually decreases over time. Dummy variables are not reported. White's robust standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients, and p-values are given in parentheses under the F-statistics. The symbols *, ** and *** denote that the individual coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. All regressions include time and country dummy variables, which are not reported. White's robust standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients, and p-values are given in parentheses under the F-statistics. The symbols *, ** and *** denote that the individual coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. Dummy variables are not reported. White's robust standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients, and p-values are given in parentheses under the F-statistics. The symbols *, ** and *** denote that the individual coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. All regressions include time and country dummy variables, which are not reported. White's robust standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients, and p-values are given in parentheses under the F-statistics. The symbols *, ** and *** denote that the individual coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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